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Essay
Martyrdom and Religious Freedom
CHRISTOPHER C. LUND
When we give religious exemptions, why do we do it? Is it because we think
people will back down otherwise or because we think they won’t? What exactly
are religious exemptions trying to avoid? The harm to conscience that submission
would bring? Or the defiance and resistance that refusal would entail?
The easy answer is both. And it is the truthful answer as well. We give
religious exemptions both to avoid the prospect of martyrdom and to avoid the
prospect of broken consciences. Religious exemptions protect human dignity and
freedom; they also avert open contestation between church and state. Both things
are good, and there is no need to choose between them.
Yet even so, the above questions still linger. And how you think about them
can end up coloring your approach to all kinds of things: which claims should
succeed and which should fail, how doctrine ought to be constructed, and what
religious liberty is all about.
This symposium essay ponders these questions, drawing from the length of the
American experience. Its basic premise is that martyrdom matters—that religious
liberty has and will be shaped by the willingness of people to suffer for their faith.
Along the way, it tries to offer some more specific and provocative thoughts.
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Martyrdom and Religious Freedom
CHRISTOPHER C. LUND *
INTRODUCTION
Two years ago, Notre Dame held a symposium, Religious Liberty and
the Free Society. At the time, Little Sisters of the Poor was pending at the
Supreme Court and no one knew how it would be resolved.1 Little Sisters
of the Poor involved the Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive mandate as it
applied to religious nonprofits.2 The nonprofits objected to the partial
exemption available to them, under which insurers and third-party
administrators would provide the objectionable forms of contraception to
their employees. Instead they wanted a total exemption from the
mandate—like the one given to houses of worship—under which
employees would not receive the prohibited forms of contraception at all.
The keynote speaker at the symposium was John Garvey, the president
of Catholic University, which at the time was a plaintiff in a companion
case to Little Sisters of the Poor.3 In the audience was John Jenkins, the
president of Notre Dame, another plaintiff in another companion case.4
There were a lot of smart people in the room that day and a lot of concern
about the mandate.
Garvey came before us in two different sets of shoes. As President of
Catholic University, he was effectively a litigant in these cases. But
Garvey’s experience as a university president had been preceded by a long
and distinguished career as a lawyer, law professor, and First Amendment
expert. No one could claim to know church-state matters better than
*
Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. I would like to thank Marc DeGirolami,
Chad Flanders, John Inazu, Douglas Laycock, Micah Schwartzman, and Elizabeth Sepper for helpful
comments on earlier drafts. A workshop at Wayne State University Law School greatly improved this
piece.
1
The case was consolidated with others into Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per
curiam).
2
Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2015). The
Court’s earlier decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), involved the
right of religious for-profit corporations. The Court resolved the case by giving religious for-profit
corporations the same partial exemption previously given to religious nonprofit corporations. Id. at
2782–83.
3
Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2015), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); see also Priests for Life v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
136 S. Ct. 446 (2015).
4
Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, 772 F.3d 229, 255–56 (D.C. Cir.
2014), vacated and remanded sub nom. Zubik v. Burwell 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016).
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Garvey; he wrote a leading church-state casebook and several important
articles.5 Garvey knew law and he knew Catholic theology. Maybe more
than any other single person, Garvey could talk with confidence about both
the legal and religious issues at stake—he could speak both objectively
about the law and about how it was subjectively experienced.
Unfortunately Garvey’s keynote was apparently not recorded. But I
remember a question from the audience. A woman, clearly on the
University’s side of the dispute, asked Garvey what would happen if
Catholic University lost. She wanted to know what other means of fighting
would be at the University’s disposal. Now Garvey could have said simply
that, once its legal options were exhausted, Catholic University would
(however reluctantly) comply with the mandate. In our day and age, this is
what one expects. And as I remember it, Garvey’s demeanor suggested this
is indeed what would probably happen, though his words were more
reserved, emphasizing the need to wait and see.
But what if Garvey had given the other answer? What if Garvey had
said Catholic University would never comply, whatever the cost—that it
would fight them on the beaches, and on the landing grounds, and that it
would never surrender. It would defy the mandate; it would incur the
millions in fines. Eventually Catholic University would owe itself to the
Department of Health and Human Services, and John Garvey himself
would walk to the White House to turn over the keys of the University to
the federal government. Such things may strike you as unlikely, even silly
to contemplate. But say you genuinely believed this is what would happen
without an exemption. Does it change anything about how you see the
case?
How much of a role does martyrdom, and fears of martyrdom, have in
our system? When we give religious exemptions, is it because we think
people will back down otherwise or because we think they won’t? What is
religious liberty trying to avoid—the prospect of martyrs or the prospect of
broken consciences? Formal doctrine, at least most of the time, does not
ask about such things; the law has an official policy of not inquiring into
how its official policy will be received. Yet maybe martyrdom, and the
prospects of martyrdom, do matter. Maybe such things do enter, however
subtly and however modestly, into how controversies between church and
state are framed and resolved.6
5

MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, JOHN H. GARVEY & THOMAS C. BERG, RELIGION AND THE
CONSTITUTION (3d ed. 2011); John H. Garvey, An Anti-Liberal Argument for Religious Freedom,
7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 275 (1996); John H. Garvey, What’s Next After Separationism?, 46
EMORY L.J. 75 (1997); John H. Garvey & Amy V. Coney, Catholic Judges in Capital Cases, 81
MARQ. L. REV. 303 (1998); see also JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? (1996).
6
A line from Robert Cover comes to mind: “The stories the resisters tell, the lives they live, the
law they make in such a movement may force the judges, too, to face the commitments entailed in their
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This symposium essay touches upon a wide range of subjects, from
religious voluntarism to the law of civil contempt; from some renowned
nineteenth century polygamy cases to some uncomfortable modern cases
of child abuse and neglect. It looks at history and theory, and even a bit of
doctrine—a few stray and probably unintended sentences by Chief Justice
Burger in a case from the 1980s, it turns out, have caused a fascinating bit
of havoc in the lower courts.
This piece is a brief exploration of martyrdom and some of the issues it
presents. These matters are too complex to yield much in the way of firm
conclusions or tidy prescriptions. But the basic premise here is that
martyrdom matters—that religious liberty has and will be shaped by the
willingness of people to suffer for their faith. And recurring throughout this
piece will be a provocative and highly speculative thought—that religious
liberty has a less certain future in a world without martyrdom, in a world
where people do not suffer for their faiths.
No one doubts religious folks are harmed when they back down and
conform. But that harm is internal to them, private and somewhat invisible,
easy to dismiss and maybe even to forget. When the religious suffer in
secular terms—when they go to prison, are fired from their jobs, lose their
churches or custody of their children—their suffering becomes more
visible and more easily understood outside the faith. Such suffering
provides a secular metric by which religious passion and commitment can
be gauged—a way ethereal religious devotion can be cashed out into hard
secular currency. Religious beliefs themselves may not translate, but the
willingness to suffer for them speaks in a language of its own. It is that
willingness to suffer which gave birth to religious liberty—that suffering
was the crucible in which the concept was forged—and it is worth
pondering what will happen to religious liberty if it goes away. Yet this
piece advances no great thesis. It contents itself with pondering over
eternally recurring questions and themes. If there are answers here, they are
for the reader to find.
I.

MARTYRDOM, BROKEN CONSCIENCE, AND FUTILE COMPLIANCE

When religious commitment collides with legal obligation, that is
where free exercise takes shape. In the classic formulation, religious
believers must choose between two masters—God or Caesar, church or
state. Of course, the law might bend to ameliorate the conflict; this is the
issue of religious exemptions, with its own intricate history.7 But if the law
judicial office and their law.” Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4,
68 (1983).
7
For an overview of that history, see Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A
Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REV. 466, 469–73 (2010).
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proves intransigent, the religious believer must ultimately choose between
faith or law without being able to satisfy both.
At this point, the road forks. A religious believer might choose faith,
accepting the legal consequences as simply the cost of living faithfully in
an unfaithful world. This we will call martyrdom. Or a religious believer
might choose law instead of faith, backing down and accepting his or her
own apparent unfaithfulness. This we will call broken conscience. The first
is the path of defiance and resistance; the second is the path of
acquiescence and submission. And connected to these ideas will be others.
Sometimes, for example, the state might lose interest in coercing
compliance because coerced compliance is in some way self-defeating—a
kind of contradiction in terms. A Quaker, for example, may be such a
terrible solider that the state may have no interest in conscripting him even
if he agrees to go.8 Maybe call this the idea of futile compliance.
The reasons for religious freedom are messy and overlapping, and any
plausible theory of religious liberty has to include both martyrdom and
broken conscience as rationales.9 Sometimes thought of as the earliest Free
Exercise case in America, People v. Philips10 involved a priest who refused
to testify against a thief that he recognized from the confessional.11 The
court explained the dilemma: “If [the priest] tells the truth, he violates his
ecclesiastical oath—If he prevaricates he violates his judicial oath—
Whether he lies, or whether he testifies the truth he is wicked.”12 This is
the familiar catch-22 at the root of all cases involving religious
exemptions, then and now. The priest cannot satisfy the requirements of
both the law and his faith. He must choose one and face the other’s wrath.
As courts often do, Philips does not discuss the prospect of
martyrdom—the court assumes that, if push came to shove, the priest
would comply with the law despite his faith. Maybe there is a subtle point
to make here; maybe it says something about the judicial craft that judges
do not like thinking too much (at least openly) about the prospect of people
defying their orders. So instead of talking about the harms of incarceration,
the court instead talks about the harm of forcing the priest to testify against

8
See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452–53 (1971) (noting “the hopelessness of
converting a sincere conscientious objector into an effective fighting man”).
9
For my own defense of religious freedom, and for some discussion of those messy and
overlapping justifications, see Christopher C. Lund, Religion is Special Enough, 103 VA. L. REV. 481
(2017).
10
People v. Philips (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813), reprinted in MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, THOMAS
C. BERG & CHRISTOPHER C. LUND, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 94–99 (4th ed. 2016).
11
For a deeper analysis of Philips, see Walter J. Walsh, The First Free Exercise Case, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1 (2004).
12
MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 10, at 96 (reprinting Philips).
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his will—such a thing, the court says, would “expose him to punishment in
a future state [and to] privations and disgrace in this world.”13
This is our idea of broken conscience, although one can see how this
label is imperfect. Forced to say what happened in that confessional, the
priest will face “the compunctious visitings of a wounded conscience,”
“disgrace in the presence of his assembled friends,” and “the gloomy
perspective of a dreadful hereafter.”14 The first two of these can be seen in
secular terms—as guilt and shame, respectively. But the third has a harder
time being translated into secular terms. This illustrates a point probably
worth making. Harms can be phrased in secular terms—in the language of
conscience—but this risks flattening the complex religious sentiments in
play.
Bearing this in mind, examples of broken conscience are everywhere.
One recent and illustrative case involved an Army Ranger who wanted to
keep his hair long, maintain a beard, and wear a turban, all in accordance
with the precepts of his Sikh faith.15 Years before, when the officer first
started off as a cadet at West Point, “before [he] fully understood what was
happening, he found himself in the barbershop with the other cadets to be
trimmed and shaved.”16 He thought he would be kicked out of West Point
if he objected, so he let it happen. Now, years later, he views that decision
with profound regret. He went through a period of “significant shame and
disappointment in himself,” he says, “for violating the Sikh religious
requirements.”17 Such cases illustrate how martyrdom and broken
conscience often go together: it is precisely that the Army Ranger feels like
he once abandoned his faith that makes him now unwilling to budge on
matters relating to it.
II.

MARTYRDOM AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Martyrdom and broken conscience each have their place, and their
relative roles are probably impossible to pin down. But the idea of
martyrdom—the prospect that religious folks will not back down from
their religious commitments—has always been with us. American churchstate history is full of people who did not back down, even after it was
clear what would happen to them if they persisted. Baptists were whipped
13

Id.
Id. The court goes on with this theme for some time, explaining how the priest’s testimony
would work “an offence against high heaven, and seal his disgrace in the presence of his assembled
friends, and to the affliction of a bereaved church and a weeping congregation.” Id.
15
Singh v. Carter, 168 F. Supp. 3d 216, 220 (D.D.C. 2016).
16
Complaint ¶¶ 71–72, Singh v. Carter, 168 F. Supp. 3d 216 (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 16-399).
17
Id. ¶ 74; cf. Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 2012) (“A sincere religious
believer doesn’t forfeit his religious rights merely because he is not scrupulous in his observance; for
where would religion be without its backsliders, penitents, and prodigal sons?”).
14
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and jailed in colonial Virginia for publishing religious sentiments and for
preaching without a license; they knew the risks they were running.18
William Penn was given several chances to take his hat off; the judge held
him in contempt only because he willfully refused to comply.19 In 1647,
Massachusetts Bay banished Catholic priests from the colony, while also
stipulating that any priest banished who came back would be put to death.20
. Defiance of the rules, even if it meant death, was something to be
expected.
Though it is impossible to establish this with any degree of confidence,
one gets the vague sense that the prospect of martyrdom loomed larger in
the minds of people centuries ago than it does today. Early American
history is heavily influenced by the Christian tradition—a tradition in
which martyrdom has had a very important role. Tertullian famously said
that the blood of the martyrs was the seed of the church.21
And maybe martyrdom was just more expected in the old days. One
wonderful case to teach is Commonwealth v. Cooke,22 a precursor to West
Virginia v. Barnette.23 Thomas Wall, an 11-year-old Catholic student, was
told by his public school teacher to read Protestant versions of the Lord’s
Prayer and the Ten Commandments in the classroom. Wall’s priest had
earlier told him to refuse.24 It was again the classic problem of two
sovereigns (writ small), and Wall had to make his choice. Refusing the
teacher’s order, he was beaten for thirty minutes with a cane. Wall thus
became a martyr (again writ small), though his case actually combines
18
See Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I:
Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2165–66 (2003) (giving examples). And
these events were influential. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to William Bradford (Jan. 27,
1774), in 1 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 104, 106 (William T. Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal
eds., 1962) (“That diabolical Hell conceived principle of persecution rages among some and to their
eternal Infamy the Clergy can furnish their Quota of Imps for such business. This vexes me the most of
any thing whatever. There are at this in the adjacent County not less than 5 or 6 well meaning men in
close Goal for publishing their religious Sentiments which in the main are very orthodox.”).
19
Michael McConnell notes how Penn’s case “became a cause célèbre in America,” and “came
up for oblique discussion in the First Congress, during the debate over the Bill of Rights.” Michael W.
McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1409, 1472 & n.320 (1990).
20
DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN CATHOLIC HISTORY 111-12 (1962).
21
THE APOLOGY OF TERTULLIAN FOR THE CHRISTIANS 147 (T. Herbert Bindley trans., Parker &
Co. 1890).
22
7 Am. L. Reg. 417 (Police Ct. 1859), as reprinted in MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 10, at
456.
23
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
24
Michael Grossberg explains the backstory. In short, Boston required Bible reading in the public
schools. But a compromise had been worked out in Catholic areas to allow Catholic texts to be used.
When some school authorities went back on the compromise, many Catholic families and parishes
objected, and Wall was thought to be an organizer and ringleader of local resistance. For these details
and more, see Michael Grossberg, Teaching the Republican Child: Three Antebellum Stories About
Law, Schooling, and the Construction of American Families, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 429, 452–55 (1997).
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martyrdom with broken conscience. Wall had been beaten slowly in the
hopes that he would back down. The court tells us that “[t]he blows were
not given in quick succession, but with deliberation,” and “there were
several intervals, at two of which [the teacher] was absent from the room
some little time.”25 In the face of that force and determination, Wall
eventually relented—he read what the teacher wanted, presumably in
tears.26 And although the court says nothing about this, one cannot help but
think about how Wall (like the Sikh Ranger)27 must have regretted backing
down later.
At the time of the Framing, maybe the most salient issue regarding the
free exercise of religion involved Quakers and the draft. This came up in
several places, among them in the First Congress’s consideration of the
proposed amendment that “no person religiously scrupulous shall be
compelled to bear arms.”28 That proposed amendment failed. And there is
not even a real record of the failure because the Senate threw out the
provision without recorded discussion.29 But in the House discussion,
several members openly discussed the role of martyrdom: Quakers would
never submit, so it would be pointless to draft them. Elias Boudinot put it
squarely: “Can any dependence . . . be placed in men who are
conscientious in this respect? [O]r what justice can there be in compelling
them to bear arms, when, according to their religious principles, they
would rather die than use them?”30 The fear was not that Quakers would
comply at the cost of their consciences; the understanding was that they
would not comply at all. From this, Roger Sherman concluded that it
25

See MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 10, at 456 (reprinting Cooke).
See Grossberg, supra note 24, at 455 (“Thomas held out for thirty minutes until, with cut and
bleeding hands, he finally repeated the Commandments.”). This combination of sometimes backing
down and sometimes remaining strong is common. Detlaf Garbe provides this account from a
Jehovah’s Witness child in Nazi Germany:
26

When I refused to give the Hitler greeting, which was daily required at school, I
would be struck, but I rejoiced to know, strengthened by my parents, that I had
remained faithful. But there were times when either because of physical punishment
or out of fear of the situation I would say “Heil Hitler.” I remember how I would
then go home, my eyes filled with tears, and how we would pray together to Jehovah
and how I would once again take courage to resist the enemy’s attacks the next time.
Then the same thing would happen again.
DETLEF GARBE, BETWEEN RESISTANCE AND MARTYRDOM: JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES IN THE THIRD
REICH 174 (Dagmar G. Grimm, trans., Univ. of Wis. Press 2008) (citation omitted).
27
See supra text accompanying notes 15–17 (discussing a Sikh Army Ranger who regretted
allowing his hair to be cut at West Point).
28
For discussion of this provision, see McConnell, supra note 19, at 1500–03.
29
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 660 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“[R]ecords of the debate in the Senate, which is where the conscientious-objector clause was removed,
do not survive . . . .”).
30
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 767 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Boudinot, Aug.
20, 1789).
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would not even make sense to require them to find substitutes or pay
equivalents: “[T]hose who are religiously scrupulous of bearing arms . . .
are equally scrupulous of getting substitutes or paying an equivalent. Many
of them would rather die than do either one or the other . . . .”31
The background here was that Quakers had long been martyrs for their
faith on this point and everyone knew it. During the Revolution,
Philadelphia had given a partial exemption to Quakers—they did not have
to fight but they did have to pay an equivalent—and Quakers often
responded with disobedience: “Quakers were fined for failing to pay taxes
or equivalents, and substantial numbers had their property sold to pay the
various sums they would not willingly turn over to the authorities.”32 But
Quakers did not just refuse to kill for country. They often died refusing to
protect themselves, which helped make their objection to war seem less
self-serving. As Justice Scalia once put it:
Quakers opposed the use of arms not just for militia service,
but for any violent purpose whatsoever—so much so that
Quaker frontiersmen were forbidden to use arms to defend
their families, even though “[i]n such circumstances the
temptation to seize a hunting rifle or knife in self-defense . . .
must sometimes have been almost overwhelming.”33
It is hard to say whether martyrdom was more expected in the olden
days. But here a trilogy of nineteenth century Mormon cases becomes
tremendously important.34 These Mormon cases are well known in the
field. But they deserve even more attention than people usually give them.
These cases have profoundly shaped how we view religious liberty in
almost subconscious ways. Forget the opinions themselves; forget the
legacy effects they have on modern doctrine (like Employment Division v.
Smith35); forget even the background events that preceded them. Maybe the
most important thing about the Mormon trilogy of cases is what happened
after them. Because what happened after them—in particular, what
happened almost exactly four months after the final opinion was issued—
has molded us in ways that we do not fully appreciate and sometimes do
not even recognize.

31

Id. at 750 (statement of Rep. Sherman, Aug. 17, 1789).
Philip Hamburger, Religious Freedom in Philadelphia, 54 EMORY L.J. 1603, 1628 (2005).
33
Heller, 554 U.S. at 590 (quoting PETER BROCK, PACIFISM IN THE UNITED STATES 359 (1968)).
34
See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 244 (1879); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Late
Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
35
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
32
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The Mormon cases flow from the polygamy of the early Mormon
church.36 Facing rejection from the rest of the country, the Mormons
moved west under Brigham Young. This was an attempt at separation of
church and state in a primal sense; the Mormons tried to separate church
and state geographically. But it did not work; the Mormons could not get
far enough away. Eventually Utah became a federal territory, and Congress
began to step in to try and stop plural marriage.37 For a time, the Mormons
survived by taking advantage of some natural advantages. Polygamy cases
were hard to prove; witnesses refused to work with authorities; local
officials declined to prosecute.38 But Congress was sufficiently determined,
and so the cases ultimately came: (1) Reynolds v. United States, which
upheld a bigamy conviction against constitutional challenge;39 (2) Davis v.
Beason, which sustained a ban on polygamists voting;40 and (3) Late
Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United
States—the caption sums up both the case’s stakes and its holding—which
validated Congress’s dissolution of the Mormon Church.41
For much of this period, Mormons refused to comply with the federal
government’s antipolygamy efforts. Mormons would go into hiding or
refuse to cooperate; they would lie or forget on the stand.42 Sometimes they
would fight in a more literal sense, like the women who resisted arrest
“with hatchet in hand.”43 This created, as such resistance always does, a
kind of game of chicken. But the Mormons were up against a Congress and
a country unwilling to swerve. As the decades went on, Congress passed
progressively more ambitious legislation and Mormons began to go to jail
in numbers for their faith. Scrutinizing the evidence over two decades,
Sarah Barringer Gordon reports that more than half of the criminal records
in Utah during this period were for unlawful cohabitation, with almost 900
indictments between 1886 and 1888.44
The final straw, and the final case in the trilogy, happened in May
1890. In Late Corporation, the Court upheld Congress’s decision to totally
dissolve the Mormon Church and to confiscate its property.45 But just as
important as what happened in May 1890 was what happened in
36

For some of the facts that follow and a wonderful overview of the subject, see SARAH
BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2002).
37
Id. at 55-83 (describing some of this legislation); MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 10, at 101–09
(providing a brief overview of these developments).
38
GORDON, supra note 36, at 161–62.
39
98 U.S. at 251.
40
133 U.S. 333, 348 (1890).
41
136 U.S. 1, 46 (1890).
42
GORDON, supra note 36, at 158–59, 161 (2002).
43
Id. at 163.
44
Id. at 157–58.
45
136 U.S. at 66.
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September 1890. Four months after the decision in Late Corporation,
Wilford Woodruff, the president of the Church, made an announcement. It
had been revealed to him that the Church should cease the practice of
plural marriage. Now, this short window of time between legal decision
and spiritual revelation suggests a cause-and-effect relationship, but
Woodruff himself made that perfectly clear when he announced the
change:
Inasmuch as laws have been enacted by Congress forbidding
plural marriages, which laws have been pronounced
constitutional by the court of last resort, I hereby declare my
intention to submit to those laws, and to use my influence
with the members of the Church over which I preside to have
them do likewise.46
A year later, Woodruff added this in explanation:
The Lord has told me to ask the Latter-day Saints a
question . . . . The question is this: Which is the wisest course
for the Latter-day Saints to pursue—to continue to attempt to
practice plural marriage, with the laws of the nation against it
and the opposition of sixty millions of people, and at the cost
of the confiscation and loss of all the Temples, and the
stopping of all the ordinances therein, both for the living and
the dead, and the imprisonment of the First Presidency and
Twelve and the heads of families in the Church, and the
confiscation of personal property of the people (all of which
of themselves would stop the practice); or, after doing and
suffering what we have through our adherence to this
principle to cease the practice and submit to the law, and
through doing so leave the Prophets, Apostles and fathers at
home, so that they can instruct the people and attend to the
duties of the Church, and also leave the Temples in the hands
of the Saints, so that they can attend to the ordinances of the
Gospel, both for the living and the dead?47
This logic is easy to follow; even children can follow the basic idea of
duress. If the two alternatives for the Mormon Church in 1890 were to
abandon polygamy or die, is death really the only true option? Religions,
like constitutions, need not be suicide pacts.
46
Wilford Woodruff, Official Declaration 1, THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY
SAINTS (Sept. 24, 1890), https://www.lds.org/scriptures/dc-testament/od/1 [https://perma.cc/44A2T23Z].
47
Wilford Woodruff, President, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, Address at the
Cache Stake Conference (Nov. 1, 1891), https://www.lds.org/scriptures/dc-testament/od/1
[https://perma.cc/ 44A2-T23Z].
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But it is important to also see this from a religious perspective, as
Woodruff himself did. Maybe the faithful thing for the Mormon church—
maybe the thing God wants—is to abandon plural marriage. This is, in fact,
what Woodruff says: If the alternatives are the abandonment of plural
marriage and the destruction of God’s church—a church that is the light
and future of the world—God’s will must be for the former. Woodruff
would have known the line about the Sabbath being made for man and not
man for the Sabbath, and Woodruff would have seen polygamy along the
same lines.48
To those who see martyrdom as essential or inherent in religion,49 this
may sound like a weak response to be expected only from people
insufficiently committed to the faith.50 But the religious logic in
Woodruff’s position holds. And there is also here a distinction between
individual and corporate martyrdom that sometimes gets lost. It is one
thing to die yourself for your faith; it is another thing to commit someone
else. And there is also the question of whether martyrdom will really work
anyway. Think about Woodruff again—or think about the mandate from
John Garvey’s position. If it would solve the problem that Catholic
University faced, Garvey might decide to go to jail for the rest of his life or
suffer personal bankruptcy. But liability for the mandate is corporate and
not personal. No amount of time that Garvey spends in jail for contempt
will save Catholic University. There is nothing he can do. Woodruff was in
the same position.
Woodruff applied a straightforward conception of duress: when
religious obligation conflicts with legal obligation, religious obligation
bends to avert the conflict. In this way, religious duress is a kind of mirror
image of religious exemption—religious exemptions involve precisely the
48

In a thoughtful and striking piece, Frederick Gedicks defends Woodruff’s position: “Mormons
understand their church to exist in the world to do God’s work, and the church clearly cannot do God’s
work unless it exists in the world . . . . From the perspective of the nineteenth-century church, there
were aspects of Mormonism which were more important than plural marriage, and it became clear to
the leaders of the church at that time that it was necessary to choose between them.” Frederick Mark
Gedicks, The Integrity of Survival: A Mormon Response to Stanley Hauerwas, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 167,
172 (1992). For a quite different approach, see Stanley Hauerwas & Michael Baxter, The Kingship of
Christ: Why Freedom of “Belief” is Not Enough, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 107, 125 (1992).
49
See Mark Tushnet, In Praise of Martyrdom?, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (1999) (“A person
who truly believes cannot—simply cannot—be induced to change his or her beliefs.”); Hauerwas &
Baxter, supra note 48, at 126–27 (similar). But see Paul Horwitz, Against Martyrdom: A Liberal
Argument for Accommodation of Religion, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1301, 1330 (2016) (arguing that
“Tushnet’s account of religious belief and its relationship with the world . . . is . . . based too much on a
theology that assumes God is done speaking” and that religious groups are constantly refining their
beliefs in ways that can appear from the outside as changes).
50
See Mark Tushnet, Accommodation of Religion Thirty Years On, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1,
25 n.125 (2015) (“[T]he general view held by non-Mormons of the Mormon abandonment of the
practice of polygamy . . . [is] the cynical view that these changes are insincere capitulations to external
pressure.”).
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same conflict but with legal obligation doing the bending. Yet here is the
knot. Knowing better than to require the impossible, religions often have
some conception of religious duress.51 But such conceptions must prompt
us to reconsider the whole issue of exemptions. In the aftermath of the
Manifesto, Woodruff remarked: “[W]e have carried [God’s
commandments] as far as we could; but when we cannot do it, we are
justified. The Lord does not require at our hands things we cannot do.”52
What could please a government more than a statement like that? This
neatly solves the problem of two masters, doesn’t it? If the Kosher rules
allow Jews to eat non-Kosher food when no Kosher food is available, why
again should a state prison provide Kosher meals? The denial of an
accommodation itself becomes an accommodation; the state erases the
religious obligation by refusing to cater to it.
The Mormon episode teaches a number of lessons about religious
exemptions. But maybe the big lesson is this: don’t make exemptions. If
you make exemptions, you will have to keep on making exemptions and
you will never get what you want. But if you don’t make exemptions, those
religious folks will back down. They might martyr themselves in the short
term, which will be hard for them and frustrating for you. But eventually
they will come along. With enough pressure and enough time, you can get
them to change their minds even about theology. And then everyone wins:
you get what you want, and they will be satisfied with the new theology
that they forget you had a role in creating.
This is all tongue-in-cheek, of course, but it is worth asking why we
shouldn’t view the Mormon cases this way. Don’t they end happily
enough? The Mormon church abandons polygamy in 1890. By 1894, every
repentant polygamist is pardoned.53 By 1896, all the church property is
returned.54 That is a swift and relatively peaceable end to a very long
conflict.55 Paul Horwitz has thoughtfully pointed out how it can go the
other way too—church-state conflicts can sometimes act to solidify, unify,
and galvanize religious groups in their opposition to the state.56 And there
are traces of Horwitz’s logic in the Mormon story too. When Congress first
51

For one example, see CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH pt. 3, art. 8(IV), ¶ 1859 (2003),
http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/__P6C.HTM [https://perma.cc/AMG9-YYGN] (“Mortal sin
requires full knowledge and complete consent . . . [which] implies a consent sufficiently deliberate to
be a personal choice.”).
52
Gedicks, supra note 48, at 171 (footnote omitted).
53
See Proclamation No. 369 (Sept. 25, 1894), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
index.php?pid=70911 [https://perma.cc/ZBQ3-4FSK].
54
See Edwin B. Firmage, Free Exercise of Religion in Nineteenth Century America: The Mormon
Cases, 7 J.L. & RELIG. 281, 312 (1989).
55
See Gedicks, supra note 48, at 169 n.6 (“[P]ersecution ceased almost immediately upon the
Mormons’ abandonment of plural marriage.”).
56
See Horwitz, supra note 49, at 1320 (“[I]lliberal religious groups—like other groups—harden
as well as soften, snap as well as bend, react as well as give.”).
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began acting against polygamy, it actually strengthened Mormon
commitment to the practice.57 Horwitz’s point is that religious freedom can
help contain and reduce illiberalism within religious groups, and he must
be right at least sometimes. But this ends up yet another disturbing aspect
of the Mormon cases. The conflict with the Mormon Church lasted decades
and only ended when Congress finally brought in the overwhelming
firepower necessary to win. Might the deep lesson be that the state needs to
stop thinking in terms of half-measures and just dial up the persecution to
eleven right from the start?58
The Mormon cases are ingrained in our consciousness; they are a core
part of our national experience with religion. They are the earliest cases
where the Supreme Court wrestles with the idea of religious exemptions—
the only such cases from the nineteenth century, in fact. And they have
some doctrinal weight even now; Employment Division v. Smith took them
as having established a rule from which the Court has never deviated.59
The Mormon cases have become a kind of dominant narrative, and it is
unfortunate that other narratives have gotten less attention. Contrast the
experience of the late-nineteenth century Mormons with the mid-twentieth
century Jehovah’s Witnesses. In World War II, five thousand Jehovah’s
Witnesses spent time in prison in America for refusing both the draft and
alternative service.60 Meanwhile, somewhere between a third to half of
Jehovah’s Witnesses in Germany were either imprisoned, executed, or sent
to concentration camps.61 And the striking thing is that Jehovah’s
Witnesses—unlike other objects of Nazi persecution like the Jews—had
the ability to stop the forces against them by signing a simple form
57

GORDON, supra note 36, at 87.
In a set of interesting papers, Netta Barak-Corren has begun exploring these matters
empirically. In one study, for example, she asked principals of conservative religious schools how they
would handle a teacher who had gotten pregnant out of wedlock. Netta Barak-Corren, Does
Antidiscrimination Law Influence Religious Behavior? An Empirical Examination, 67 HASTINGS L.J.
957, 978, 989–91 (2016). She found that legal outcomes and the kinds of legal remedies imposed had
significant though complicated effects on religious decision-making. Id. at 1019. See also Netta BarakCorren, Beyond Dissent and Compliance: Religious Decision Makers and Secular Law, 6 OXFORD J.L.
& RELIG. 293, 294–95 (2017).
59
See 494 U.S. 872, 878–82 (1990) (“We have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs
excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to
regulate. . . . We first had occasion to assert that principle in Reynolds v. United States . . . [and] the
rule to which we have adhered ever since Reynolds plainly controls [this case].” (citation omitted)).
60
Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 29 (1990) (citing
MULFORD Q. SIBLEY & PHILIP E. JACOB, CONSCRIPTION OF CONSCIENCE: THE AMERICAN STATE AND
THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR, 1940–1947, at 34, 83–84, 355–58 (1952)); see also M. JAMES
PENTON, APOCALYPSE DELAYED 142–43 (2d ed. 1997).
61
See DETLEF GARBE, BETWEEN RESISTANCE AND MARTYRDOM: JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES IN THE
THIRD REICH 484 (2008) (summarizing and scrutinizing a number of academic works, concluding that
there were between “25,000 and 30,000 [Jehovah’s Witnesses]” and “[t]en thousand of [them] were
imprisoned for various periods of time”).
58
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62

renouncing their faith. (Few did. ) But only in this way can we understand
the otherwise bewildering remark by the director of the Research Institute
at the United States Holocaust Museum: “The Jehovah’s Witnesses were
literally the only martyrs of the Holocaust.”63
If the lesson of the Mormons is that sometimes religious people will
back down, the lesson of the Jehovah’s Witnesses is that sometimes they
won’t. But many people know the Mormon experience; fewer know about
the Witnesses’. Most church-state classes cover the Mormon era in some
detail; my sense is that most do not even mention the Jehovah’s Witnesses
in World War II. Perhaps this is because most law school classes tend to
revolve around Supreme Court cases—although there are actually some
Supreme Court cases tangentially bearing on this issue.64
This theme of martyrdom runs through the entire Jehovah’s Witness
experience. Take, for example, their refusal of blood transfusions. Often
such refusals happen outside of any legal context—no legal issue
necessarily arises simply because a Jehovah’s Witness refuses a
transfusion and then dies a preventable death. But occasionally that
suffering intersects with law, and then one can see notions of martyrdom
quite clearly.
A case out of Kansas involves martyrdom in the literal sense. Mary
Stinemetz was a Jehovah’s Witness on Medicaid who needed a liver
transplant.65 Ordinary liver transplants require blood transfusions. But in
Nebraska, they were now doing bloodless liver transplants—transplants,
amazingly enough, without transfusions. Yet Kansas refused to pay for
62

Detlef Garbe explains how, early on, some Witnesses were willing to sign statements
guaranteeing them release. But those early statements required Witnesses only to pledge future good
behavior; they did not require a renunciation of the faith. When later statements required a clear and
unambiguous renunciation of the faith, “extremely low numbers” of Jehovah’s Witnesses signed them.
Id. at 287. This, of course, baffled the Nazis: “How could somebody who is given the opportunity to be
released choose to go to a concentration camp?” Id. at 291.
63
See Joel P. Engardio, Jehovah’s Witnesses’ Untold Story of Resistance to Nazis, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR (Nov. 6, 1996) (“Unlike Jews and others targeted by the Nazis, the Witnesses were
prisoners of conscience. They could have bought freedom by signing a declaration card that renounced
their faith and pledged allegiance to Hitler. Few took the offer.”).
64
In Cox v. United States, 332 U.S. 442 (1947), the Supreme Court ruled 5–4 against several
Jehovah’s Witnesses seeking to be considered ministers within the meaning of the World War II draft
exemption. Cox is particularly interesting now after the Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC,
565 U.S. 171 (2012). Hosanna-Tabor and Cox involve quite different contexts, of course, but both
cases address the scope and justifications of a ministerial exception. Various comparisons and contrasts
come to mind. To take one example, Cox and Hosanna-Tabor have different takes on the relevance of
the time someone spends on religious activities. Compare Cox, 332 U.S. at 451 (“The documents show
that Thompson and Roisum spent only a small portion of their time in religious activities, and this fact
alone . . . is sufficient for the board to deny them a minister’s classification.”), with Hosanna-Tabor,
565 U.S. at 194 (“The amount of time an employee spends on particular activities is relevant in
assessing that employee’s status, but that factor cannot be considered in isolation, without regard to the
nature of the religious functions performed and the other considerations discussed above.”).
65
Stinemetz v. Kan. Health Policy Auth., 252 P.3d 141, 143 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011).
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such a procedure for Stinemetz, because Kansas had a policy of only
reimbursing in-state procedures.66 Kansas probably thought Mary
Stinemetz would back down. Surely, if push came to shove, she would
choose the regular liver transplant over dying. But that is not what
happened. Instead Mary Stinemetz died—a martyr for her faith in twentyfirst century America.
An equally dramatic case involving Jehovah’s Witnesses and blood
transfusions comes out of Mississippi. Mattie Brown was a Jehovah’s
Witness who had been shot by her daughter. The state knew that Brown
was a Jehovah’s Witness and that she would refuse a blood transfusion.
Worried that Brown would die and thus deprive it of a valuable witness,
the state went to court and got an order forcing a blood transfusion on her
over her objections.67 The Mississippi Supreme Court eventually found
that order unconstitutional, but it was too late—the surgery (and the
transfusion) had already happened. And so Mattie Brown had to live with
the contamination of her body and the possible loss of her salvation.
Some think there are changes afoot in American religion—that religion
in the United States is becoming less of a durable commitment and more of
a lifestyle.68 People have more choice in their religious faiths and more
consciously experience their religious faiths as chosen. But however true
this may be, there are still millions of Americans who are resolute in their
faiths. And one cannot help but wonder whether, in some deep way, the
law is responsive to that. When one looks at cases involving Jehovah’s
Witnesses and blood transfusions as they arise in various contexts, one sees
judges taking inordinate care to protect the religious beliefs in question.69
In the Stinemetz case, for example, the Kansas court was in no way bound
to give a religious exemption. That court essentially created a right of
religious exemption through a bold reinterpretation of its state constitution.

66
And this came despite the fact that bloodless liver transplants actually cost less than regular
ones, so an exception for Stinemetz here would have actually saved Kansas money. See id. at 155 (“[I]t
appears that the bloodless technique for a liver transplant is less expensive than a procedure involving
blood transfusions, which the KHPA is willing to fund. Thus, the KHPA is unable to argue that the
agency is being fiscally responsible as the steward of Kansas tax dollars by denying Stinemetz’ request
for prior authorization for the bloodless liver transplant.”).
67
In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033, 1035 (Miss. 1985).
68
This is a theme of ALAN WOLFE, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN RELIGION: HOW WE
ACTUALLY LIVE OUR FAITH (2003). For some thoughtful reflections on Wolfe’s book in contexts close
to ours, see Richard W. Garnett, Assimilation, Toleration, and the State’s Interest in the Development
of Religious Doctrine, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1645, 1660–69 (2004).
69
For an analysis of this, see Christopher C. Lund, RFRA, State RFRAs, and Religious Minorities,
53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 163, 166–67, 169, 171–73 (2016) (discussing various instances involving
Jehovah’s Witnesses in various postures).
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It ratcheted up the standard of review because it could and because there
was a result it believed justice clearly demanded.70
Martyrs are frustrating people to deal with—they are “prickly people,”
as Tom Berg has put it.71 There is an understandable temptation to shout at
William Penn that it is just a hat; he need not go to jail for this. Cases
frequently involve religious practices that are meaningless outside the
faith, often even unnoticeable to the rest of us. We think of how we wear
our hair and whether we wear a scarf as fashion choices; some of us loathe
them accordingly. But there are people who will not compromise on such
matters and will lose everything to follow the dictates of conscience.
One striking case involved a Native American kindergartner whose
family had recently moved to Needville, Texas.72 The family asked the
school district to let the boy wear his hair long, in accordance with
religious beliefs of their Apache tribe. The school refused, insisting that
only girls could have long hair. But perhaps the most arresting thing about
the case is the family’s commitment. The boy had never cut his hair and
the boy’s father had not cut his hair in ten years. The father was threatened
with the loss of his job unless he cut his hair; he refused to cut his hair. The
father was told to cut his hair for brain surgery; he still refused to cut his
hair. Faced with all this, the Fifth Circuit treated this as an easy case:
“Superintendent Rhodes’s concern for aesthetic homogeneity . . . is
insufficiently compelling to overtake the sincere exercise of religious
belief.”73
If judges can be influenced by notions of martyrdom, legislatures can
as well. Legislatures sometimes make religious exemptions, and certain
classes of legislative exemptions make sense mostly if martyrdom (and the
prospect of martyrdom) is taken as a primary rationale. If religious
believers in question will violate the law in question and endure the
assigned punishment, that becomes a reason why a legislature might
exempt them ex ante. In such cases, the state is essentially backing down—
recognizing that for all its powers, the state has limited ability to command
obedience and that sometimes it may not be worth punishing
disobedience.74
70

Later the Kansas legislature passed its state RFRA, statutorily codifying the holding in
Stinemetz. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-5301–5305 (2013) (describing the provisions of the state
RFRA).
71
See Thomas C. Berg, The Pledge of Allegiance and the Limited State, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL.
41, 70 (2003) (“In matters of religious liberty, we must give substantial attention to the prickly people;
it is their rights that are most often at stake.”).
72
For the case and the facts that follow, see A.A. ex rel. Betenbaugh v. Needville Indep. Sch.
Dist., 611 F.3d 248, 251–58 (5th Cir. 2010).
73
Id. at 271.
74
See Mark Tushnet, In Praise of Martyrdom?, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1123 (1999) (“[Such acts
of defiance] put the question to the State: What do you truly want to do?”).

2018]

MARTYRDOM AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

977

Exemptions from the draft, previously discussed in this Essay, may be
the best example. Quakers paid fines for resisting the draft in the
eighteenth century and Jehovah’s Witnesses went to prison for resisting the
draft in the twentieth.75 Even if a legislature had no sympathy for the
religious beliefs or groups in question, draft exemptions could make sense
as a way of dealing with the sheer fact of noncompliance.
Another area where (for good reason) there is little sympathy with the
religious belief in question is with religious exemptions to child abuse and
neglect laws. These religious exemptions come not from courts but from
legislatures, who have sometimes protected religious parents who forego
medical treatment for their children for religious reasons. The details of
these exemption schemes vary considerably. Some states immunize
religious folks from civil claims of child neglect; some immunize them
from criminal claims of abuse and neglect; a few even immunize them
from charges of homicide.76 The background here is that a number of
faiths, often insular Christian communities, believe in the avoidance of
modern medicine as a matter of faith.
These exemptions are striking. The life of a child is a compelling
governmental interest, if anything is. If ever there were a place where the
law should override religious judgments, this would be it.77 These
exemptions thus seem not only indefensible but incomprehensible. There is
no conceivable rationale for letting children die when they could be saved.
But of course, this is where notions of martyrdom come in.78 What if the
religious parents in these cases will not back down? What if there is
nothing the state can do to make them change their minds? After all, if
parents are willing to stomach the possible death of their child, and all that
comes with that, no threat the state will impose is likely to matter all that
much.
The cases here are hard to read. But take the case of the Schaibles, a
faith-healing family from Pennsylvania who rejected medical care on

75

See supra notes 28–32 and accompanying text.
Walter H. Hawes IV, Faith-Healing Prosecutions: How Religious Parents Are Treated
Unfairly by Laws That Protect Their Liberty, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 885, 893–94 & nn.56–57 (2017);
MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: THE PERILS OF EXTREME RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 64 (2d ed.
2014); Douglas Laycock, A Syllabus of Errors, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1169, 1173 (2007).
77
Most will agree with this: “Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not
follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have
reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for themselves.” Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
78
This is not to say that this was the original rationale for these legislative exemptions. For an
overview of that quite path-dependent history, see Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Religion
Is Not a Basis for Harming Others, 104 GEO. L.J. 1111, 1125–26 & nn.115–23 (2016) (reviewing
PAUL A. OFFIT, BAD FAITH: WHEN RELIGIOUS BELIEF UNDERMINES MODERN MEDICINE (2015)).
76
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religious principle. They lost their two-year-old son, Kent, to treatable
pneumonia. Convicted of involuntary manslaughter, they were sentenced
to ten years of probation. Years later, the Schaibles had another child,
Brandon, who was eight months old when he came down with pneumonia.
The situation must have felt eerily familiar to them. Again they did not see
a doctor and Brandon too ended up dying—a second child lost to perfectly
treatable pneumonia. One gets a sense that the deterrent functions of the
law simply do not operate here: If Kent’s death, and the prospect of
Brandon’s death, are not enough to make the parents take Brandon to see a
doctor, what can the law do? The law seems anemic in comparison to the
powers with which we are now dealing.
We can put the Schaibles in jail; we probably should. But still we must
ask what good will be served by doing so. The children are dead. Jail is not
going to deter the Schaibles. Maybe jail for the Schaibles would help deter
the less committed members of their religious community, although those
folks will be the ones least in need of deterrence—they would be the ones
already likely to turn tail and go see a doctor if their children became
seriously ill. There is still the simple retributive case, of course. But even
this gets complicated, because conceptions of blameworthiness get
complicated. Reading these cases is like reading cases about criminally
insane defendants; the more you read, the harder it becomes to judge the
defendants because they do not seem like they are from this world.
Perhaps the Schaibles should lose custody of their remaining children.
There is a sense to this too, though it is different than saying the Schaibles
should be thrown in jail. Taking away custody is prospective and
preventative; jail is retrospective and punitive. But even the custodial
question gets tricky, because such arguments are so obviously elastic—
they would support the state preemptively taking away all the children of
every faith-healing family at birth.
One sees some of these points in State v. Hickman, a recent Oregon
case involving a family belonging to the Followers of Christ.80 The parents
were sentenced to six years in prison on manslaughter charges relating to
the death of their newborn, David. Shannon Hickman had gone into labor
two months early. Some people do home births nowadays, but no one
would do that with a baby two months premature. Yet Shannon went to her
parents’ house for the delivery, as her religion taught. And she stayed
there, even after the newborn refused to eat, even after his breathing
became labored, and even after he changed color from pink to blue-andgray. The facts of this case are visceral and painful; suffice it to say that the
baby died from sepsis nine hours after birth. Of course these parents are
79

For this case and the facts that follow, see Commonwealth v. Schaible, No. 1003 EDA 2014,
2014 WL 10584785 at *1–*2, *4–*7 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sept. 15, 2014).
80
For the case and the facts that follow, see State v. Hickman, 358 P.3d 987, 988–91 (Or. 2015).
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blameworthy in every usual sense of the term: All of these problems would
have been handled if the child had been born in a hospital or sent to the
hospital shortly after birth.81 But at the same time, the reader here feels not
only anger at the parents, but also confusion, sadness, and despair. Try as
one might to deny it, the Hickmans here did what they earnestly thought
best for their child. And even after their child’s death—a child they
loved—the two parents still believed that what they did was right: “Both of
them testified that, looking back on David’s death, they would not have
done anything differently.”82 In the second Schaible case, where the
parents were sentenced to three-and-a-half to seven years in prison, the
trial judge described them as “loving and caring parents, with the
significant exception of their absurd and dangerous views on medical care
for their children.”83
This is martyrdom. The law can punish disobedience after the fact, and
it can try to circumvent the possibility of disobedience (by, for example,
preemptively taking away custody). But it has a hard time coercing
obedience before the fact. This is not to say that the Schaibles and
Hickmans of the world have suffered enough. Maybe they haven’t. But
despite the obvious retributive case, the question lingers—what is there is
to be gained by imprisoning a couple who have lost their children?
Of course, these cases simultaneously push in the other direction as
well. All this discussion of martyrdom can illustrate how the whole
concept of religious accommodation can seem wrong-headed, dangerous,
and borderline insane. In these cases, the state and a religious believer are
trapped in a game of chicken, so to speak. Both sides say the same thing:
Sometimes we will back down and sometimes we won’t. Sometimes we
will back down because we suspect you won’t. But on some things, we
will refuse to back down. And you can’t know in advance which things
those are.
In such situations, why should the state be the one to swerve? Does it
not send a terrible message—that rather than expecting private citizens to
back down, the state will itself back down? And does it not set a terrible
precedent—by suggesting that the state will back down when faced with
81

Striking is this passage:
If defendants had called 9–1–1 at the moment that David was born, when they
noticed that he was born prematurely, medical professionals immediately would
have been able to give David antibiotics to ward off any infection resulting from
Shannon’s chorioamnionitis; to monitor and regulate David’s temperature and
breathing; and to feed David intravenously. If David had received that treatment,
one doctor estimated that David would have had a 99 percent chance of survival.

Id. at 990.
82
Id. at 991.
83
Schaible, 2014 WL 10584785, at *8.
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disobedience, does it not encourage such disobedience? Any game theorist
would tell you what the state needs to do. The state needs to credibly and
irrevocably precommit to not making exemptions. But this runs
problematically into the prevenient nature of religious beliefs. The
religious believers in these cases already have precommitted to their
course of action. The state finds itself the last party to act, which is
intolerable in games of chicken.
III.

MARTYRDOM IN THEORY AND DOCTRINE

All these ideas—about whether religious believers will back down or
not, about the relative theoretical roles of the rationales of martyrdom and
broken conscience—would be interesting even if they had nothing to do
with the doctrine or theory of religious freedom. But they do have
something to do with the doctrine and theory of religious freedom.
To start with theory, some of the most influential and persuasive
accounts of religious accommodations speak in terms of incentives. Take
Douglas Laycock’s notion of substantive neutrality, under which “the
religion clauses require government to minimize the extent to which it
either encourages or discourages religious belief or disbelief, practice or
nonpractice, observance or nonobservance.”84 This is about incentives:
government should not be pressuring people on religious matters, in any
direction. But if you think about this for more than a second, it raises a
query. If exemptions are about relieving religious pressure, what about
those who experience no pressure? Martyrs—those truly committed to the
faith—are not going to change their ways for want of a religious
exemption. Does that mean we have less reason to give exemptions to such
folks?
It is easy to brush off such ideas as silly and beside the point. But
before doing that, consider the Supreme Court decision that has led lower
courts down precisely this kind of path: Thomas v. Review Board.85 Chief
Justice Burger surely had his virtues. But he really did a number on First
Amendment doctrines, at least in the area of the Religion Clauses.
Conservatives usually start with his opinion in Lemon v. Kurtzman,86
criticizing it for the doctrine it created.87 Liberals usually start with his
84
Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion,
39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1001 (1990). Michael McConnell and Richard Posner developed similar ideas
under the label of “incentive neutrality.” See Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 37 (1989) (“The purpose of
the Free Exercise Clause, in this view, is to remove governmental disincentives to religious choice.”).
85
450 U.S. 707 (1981).
86
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
87
The classic line is still Justice Scalia’s: “Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that
repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon
stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school
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opinion in Marsh v. Chambers, criticizing it for the doctrine it ignored—
namely Lemon, which, again, Burger had written.89
Chief Justice Burger’s opinion in Thomas v. Review Board has
attracted less notice, but it too has its issues. Thomas involved a Jehovah’s
Witness who worked at a foundry fabricating sheet steel.90 When the
foundry closed, he was transferred to a department that made tank turrets.
But Thomas was a pacifist, and he refused to make tank turrets. So he quit
his job. Earlier cases had held that religious objectors had to be given
unemployment benefits in such circumstances.91 But the Indiana courts
denied Thomas benefits because they deemed his objections too
inconsistent to count as genuinely religious.92 Other Jehovah’s Witnesses
were willing to make tank turrets, and Thomas himself had proved willing
to make sheet steel (some of which would later be used for tank turrets).
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ruled for Thomas in an eight to one
decision.
Usually when Thomas is taught, it is for some now-uncontroversial
premises. Courts generally should not investigate whether a person’s
beliefs are internally consistent or whether they are consistent with the
beliefs of their co-religionists. But Thomas also contains a curious passage
about burdens. Sherbert had held the denial of unemployment benefits
counted as a burden for Free Exercise purposes.93 That logic was akin to
the logic of Laycock’s notion of substantive neutrality: just as much as a
civil fine or criminal penalty, the loss of unemployment benefits can
pressure people away from their religious commitments. In Thomas,
Justice Burger quotes the relevant passages from Sherbert, but then adds
this:
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit
upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it
denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by
religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an
adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a
burden upon religion exists. While the compulsion may be

attorneys . . . .” Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
88
463 U.S. 783 (1983).
89
See id. at 800–01 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I have no doubt that, if any group of law students
were asked to apply the principles of Lemon to the question of legislative prayer, they would nearly
unanimously find the practice to be unconstitutional.”).
90
For the facts that follow, see Thomas, 450 U.S. at 710–13.
91
E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399, 401–02 (1963).
92
Thomas, 450 U.S. at 713–15 (referring to Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 391
N.E.2d 1127 (1979)).
93
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
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indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless
substantial.94
Sherbert had created a categorical rule that the loss of government
benefits was a burden. And in defending that rule, the Court spoke of the
religious pressure that such losses can create.95 But Thomas could be read
to suggest something slightly different—namely, that the loss of
government benefits should count as a burden only when it creates
religious pressure in the individual case. When Thomas speaks of
“important benefit[s],” it leaves the reader to wonder what benefits might
not be sufficiently important. When Thomas speaks of “substantial
pressure,” the reader wonders what amounts of pressure might be
constitutionally insufficient.
To be sure, Burger probably did not mean to create doctrine here at all.
He probably just meant to repeat what Sherbert said and put it in his own
words. But his addition of gratuitous adjectives (“important” and
“substantial”) confuses the matter and threatens to make new requirements
from old cases.
To be sure, Thomas should not be read this way. The idea that a burden
exists only when there is “substantial pressure” in some individual case,
cannot square with the Supreme Court’s other cases. The Court in
Sherbert, for example, did not care how much religious pressure Adele
Sherbert actually experienced—it did not talk about how much in
unemployment benefits she received, or how much money she had, or how
committed she was to her faith. Sherbert created a categorical rule: if the
government requires you on pain of penalty to do something your religion
forbids, or forbids something your religion requires, that is a burden on
religious exercise.96
Yet if one took this possibility from Thomas seriously, it would be a
different way of approaching free exercise cases. In each individual case,
the judge would try to discern how much religious pressure would be
created by the denial of an exemption. Only in cases of significant pressure
would exemptions be appropriate. In this way, religious exemptions would

94

Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717–18.
See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (“[T]o condition the availability of benefits upon this appellant’s
willingness to violate a cardinal principal of her religious faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of
her constitutional liberties.”).
96
See discussion supra note 95 and accompanying text regarding Sherbert. In the Supreme
Court’s recent case involving a Muslim prisoner seeking to wear a beard, the state memorably told him:
“You will abide by [Arkansas Department of Correction] policies and if you choose to disobey, you can
suffer the consequences.” Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 861 (2015). The Court’s opinion concludes
this is a substantial burden, but the opinion never explains what “suffer the consequences” actually
means. The Court simply moves on to the next issue. See id. at 861–63.
95
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be reserved for non-martyrs. After all, if exemptions are designed to
relieve religious pressure, true martyrs will not need them.97
This would be a radical and fascinating change in the doctrine. It
would mean, for example, there was no burden in the Stinemetz case—the
Kansas case involving a Jehovah’s Witness on Medicaid who needed a
liver transplant but objected to a blood transfusion. The religious
exemption made a lot of sense—it cost the state less money and saved a
human being’s life.98 But under this conception of Thomas, Stinemetz
could not even claim to be burdened by Kansas’s denial, because, in
Thomas’ terms, she would not have felt any “substantial pressure” to
“modify [her] behavior” or “violate [her] beliefs.”99 Mary Stinemetz was
never going to back down, no matter what.
Yet an even better example of the strangeness of this logic comes from
a case where it was adopted.100 Jason Heap was an applicant for a Navy
Chaplaincy. Things looked good for Heap; he had studied theology at
Oxford and got a perfect score in the personal interview. But eventually it
came out that Heap wanted to be a Humanist chaplain, and that pretty
much doomed his chances. He brought a straightforward claim of religious
discrimination, which seemed quite plausible.
Yet the district court denied Heap’s claims on the startling theory—
taken from Burger’s opinion in Thomas—that even if Heap’s claim of
discrimination was factually correct and legally cognizable, his claim still
failed because the burden on him was insufficient. Here is the court’s
logic:
Here, Dr. Heap has not shown that becoming a Humanist
Navy chaplain is dictated by the tenets of Humanism or that
by not becoming a Navy chaplain he is somehow in violation
of the tenets of Humanism. Rejecting Heap from the Navy
chaplaincy does not put substantial pressure on Dr. Heap to
modify his behavior and violate his beliefs.101
This logic is counterintuitive; it may take a few readings to follow it.
But the essence is simply this: Heap is such a committed Humanist that he
won’t abandon his Humanist convictions simply because we don’t give

97

In Thomas’ terms, because a “burden upon religion exists” only when there is “substantial
pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs,” a true martyr will never be
burdened. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717–18.
98
See supra notes 65–65 and accompanying text summarizing the Stinemetz case.
99
See Stinemetz v. Kan. Health Policy Auth., 252 P.3d 141, 147 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011) (explaining
that Stinemetz would have refused to accept a blood transfusion “even in a life-threatening situation”).
100
See Heap v. Carter, 112 F. Supp. 3d 402 (E.D. Va. 2015). For more on the facts of this case,
see id. at 409–11.
101
Id. at 422.
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him a job, so there’s no substantial burden on his religious beliefs when we
don’t give him that job.
This logic is unlikely to persuade people, in part because of its raw
unfairness and in part because it does not fit with anything else the Court
has ever done. It is inconsistent with Sherbert and other recent cases. It
would be like saying, in McDaniel v. Paty, that states could exclude
ministers from serving in the constitutional convention because no one
would abandon the ministry over such a small thing.102
Yet these arguments keep resurfacing. They did so, for example, last
term in the Supreme Court’s decision in Trinity Lutheran.103 Trinity
Lutheran involved a Missouri program that gave money to resurface school
playgrounds, but categorically excluded religious schools from
participating. One of the state’s arguments was that the denial of funds was
insufficient to amount to a burden on religious exercise, because it was too
insignificant to create any religious pressure on the school.104 The Court
never mentioned the argument.
What makes this argument so interesting, of course, is how it inverts
traditional understandings regarding martyrdom. It says the weak (those
susceptible to religious pressure) should get exemptions and the strong
(those not so susceptible) should not. But our earlier discussion of
martyrdom imagined it precisely the other way: giving exemptions to the
strong (those who will not back down) but not the weak (those who will).
And there is, in fact, an area of law that does exactly the latter—an
area of law where judges make predictive judgments about who will
comply, and where the law exempts those that it decides will not comply.
This is the realm of civil contempt. The classic paradigm case here works
well for us. Take a reporter who refuses to turn over her sources despite a
valid subpoena. Black-letter law says that the reporter should be
incarcerated to get the reporter to comply with the court’s order. But the
black-letter law also makes an exception. If it becomes sufficiently clear
that the reporter will not comply, civil contempt becomes inappropriate
and the reporter must be released.105 Of course, the judge does not simply
102

See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628–29 (1978) (holding unconstitutional a provision of
the Tennessee Constitution that barred ministers from serving as delegates in the state constitutional
convention).
103
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
104
This is how Missouri proposed to distinguish Locke v. Davey: “A state’s refusal to support an
aspiring pastor’s religious education surely exerts a greater pressure on free religious exercise than does
a state’s refusal to subsidize a church daycare’s secular capital improvement project.” Brief for
Respondent at *21, Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017) (No.
15-577), 2016 WL 3548944, at *21. Missouri also quoted the familiar passage from Thomas quoted in
the text about how there needed to be “substantial pressure” on the religious adherent to violate his
beliefs. Id. at *27.
105
At that point, criminal contempt takes over. See, e.g., 3A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 703 (4th ed.) (“Because the justification of imprisonment for
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take the reporter’s word that she will never comply; every reporter would
simply learn to say the right words. Instead, the judge must make a
predictive judgment about whether the reporter will comply.106 And judges
making these decisions seem to be well aware of how speculative their
judgments will inevitably be.107
CONCLUSION
Martyrdom is a fascinating topic with a long history, much of it having
nothing to do with law. But the law too must address martyrdom. It must
decide what to do about martyrs, just as martyrs must decide what to do
about the law. The resulting relationship, dialectical and iterative, leads to
some knotty puzzles regarding faith and law, and provides a unique
window into what religious liberty is all about. Rather than trying to solve
those puzzles, this Essay instead tries simply to describe the view through
that window.

civil contempt is to induce compliance with the court’s order, the defendant can no longer be confined
after compliance becomes impossible [or] [w]hen it becomes obvious that sanctions for contempt are
not going to compel compliance.”).
106
See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 994 F. Supp. 2d 510, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Essentially, the
judge is called upon to predict whether the contemnor has in turn correctly predicted his own
obstinacy.”).
107
See Simkin v. United States, 715 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1983) (“A district judge’s determination
whether a civil contempt sanction has lost any realistic possibility of having a coercive effect is
inevitably far more speculative than his resolution of traditional factual issues.”).

